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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of defining "terrorism" has vexed the international
community for years. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly
called for the convening of an international conference to define terrorism and
distinguish it from legitimate acts in furtherance of national liberation
struggles.' A decade ago, representing the United States, I gave a speech in the
United Nations Sixth (Legal) Committee, in which I pointed out that general
definitions of terrorism "are notoriously difficult to achieve and dangerous in
what all but the most perfect of definitions excludes by chance.",2 Today, we
hear calls for a renewed effort to reach international agreement on a definition
of terrorism, drawing from existing definitions of war crimes as a way around
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy, New England
School of Law, formerly Counsel to the Counter Terrorism Bureau, Attorney Adviser for Law Enforcement
and Intelligence (1989-1991), and Attorney Adviser for United Nations Affairs (1991-1993), United States
Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser.
I. See e.g., G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR, 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/46/654 (1991).
2. See Press Release, Michael P. Scharf, United States Advisor to the Forty-Sixth General
Assembly, in the Sixth Committee, on Item 125, Terrorism (Oct. 21, 1991) (on file with author) (USUN 63-
(91)).
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the definitional quagmire.' This presents a case study for the topic of today's
panel and raises the question: Is the convergence of the laws of war and
international criminal law always a good thing?
II. THE CASE FOR DEFINING TERRORISM AS THE PEACETIME EQUIVALENT OF
WAR CRIMES
Terrorism can occur during armed conflict or during peacetime (defined
as the non-existence of armed conflict). When terrorism is committed in an
international or internal armed conflict (including a guerrilla war), it is covered
by the detailed provisions of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols of 1977.4 These conventions provide very specific
definitions of a wide range of prohibited conduct, they apply to both soldiers
and civilian perpetrators, they trigger command responsibility, and they create
universal jurisdiction to prosecute those who engage in prohibited acts. The
Conventions specifically prohibit use of violence against non-combatants,
hostage taking, and most of the other atrocities usually committed by terrorists.
The key is the "armed conflict" threshold. By their terms, these
conventions do not apply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions
such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence." '5 In those situations,
terrorism is not covered by the laws of war, but rather by a dozen anti-terrorism
conventions, which outlaw hostage-taking,6 hijacking,7 aircraft' and maritime
3. See Alex P. Schmid, The Definition of Terrorism, A Study in Compliance With CTL/9/91/2207
for the U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch (Dec. 1992) (on file with the author).
4. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
5. Waldemar Soilf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under
Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U.L REv. 53, 62-63 (1983) (quoting Article 1(2) of
Protocol 11).
6. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/145 (XXXIV), U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146 (1979).
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641,
I.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
sabotage,9 attacks at airports,' ° attacks against diplomats and government
officials," attacks against United Nations peacekeepers, 2 use of bombs 13 or
biological, chemical or nuclear materials. These peacetime anti-terrorism
Conventions establish universal jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators, require
states where perpetrators are found to either prosecute them or extradite them,
and establish a duty to provide judicial cooperation for other states.
There are significant gaps in the regime of the peacetime anti-terrorism
conventions. For example, assassinations of businessmen, engineers, journalists
and educators are not covered, while similar attacks against diplomats and
public officials are prohibited. Attacks or acts of sabotage by means other than
explosives against a passenger train or bus, or a water supply or electric power
plant, are not covered; while similar attacks against an airplane or an ocean liner
would be. Most forms of cyber-terrorism are not covered by the anti-terrorism
conventions.
Defining terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes would fill
most of these gaps. As described below, domestic and international judicial
bodies are beginning to apply the laws of war to peacetime acts of terrorism,
thereby setting a precedent for this approach.
A. The Juan Carlos Abella Human Rights Case
The most recent example is the Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina case,
decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1997." The
case concerned the January 23, 1989 attack by 42 civilians, armed with civilian
weapons, on the La Tablada military barracks in Argentina during peacetime.
The Argentine government sent 1,500 troops to subdue this terrorist attack.
Allegedly, after four hours of fighting, the civilian attackers tried to surrender
by waving white flags, but the Argentine troops refused to accept their surrender
and the fighting raged on for another thirty hours until most of the attackers
were killed or badly wounded by incendiary weapons.
9. Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, adopted by the International Maritime Organization, at Rome, Mar. 10, 1988, I.M.O. Doc.
SVA/CON/l 5.
10. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention of September 23, 1971, Feb. 24, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-19 (1988).
11. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. 8532.
12. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, 34 I.LM.
482 (entered into force on Jan. 15, 1999).
13. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, (Mar. 1998) 37 I.LM. 249.
14. Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V./I.95, doc. 7 rev. 271 (1997).
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The Inter-American Commission first held that international humanitarian
law (the laws of war) was part of its subject matter jurisdiction by implied
reference in Article 27(1) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 15
Next, the Commission held that the confrontation at the La Tablada barracks
was not merely an internal disturbance or tension (in which case it would not
qualify as an armed conflict subject to the laws of war). The Commission stated
that international humanitarian law "does not require the existence of large scale
and generalized hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in which
dissident armed groups exercise control over parts of national territory." The
Commission found the confrontation at the La Tablada barracks to qualify as an
armed conflict because it involved a carefully planned, coordinated and
executed armed attack against a quintessential military objective-a military
base-notwithstanding the small number of attackers involved and the short
time frame of the fighting. 6 The Commission thus stated that had the
Argentinean troops in fact refused to accept the surrender of the civilian
attackers, or had they in fact used weapons of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering, this would have constituted a war crime. 17
However, "because of the incomplete nature of the evidence," the Commission
was unable to find against Argentina concerning these allegations. 8
The Juan Carlos Abella case is an important precedent because it lowers
the armed conflict threshold so that many terrorist situations could now qualify
for application of the laws of war. But it also highlights several potential
problems with applying the laws of war to terrorist attacks. First, by confining
their attack to a military barracks, the terrorists themselves acted lawfully under
the laws of war. Conversely, the laws of war would constrain the methods the
government could use to quell the attack.
B. The Fawaz Yunis Prosecution
A second case in which a court applied the laws of war to a peacetime
terrorist act was United States v. Yunis. 19 Fawaz Yunis was a member of the
Amal militia which opposed the presence of the PLO in Lebanon. On June 11,
1985, Fawaz Yunis hijacked a Jordanian airliner from Beirut and attempted to
fly it to the PLO Conference in Tunis to make a political statement. At his trial
in the United States for committing acts of terrorism (hijacking and hostage
taking), Yunis sought to use the obedience to orders defense." This is the




19. United States v. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
20. id. at 1095.
defense made famous in the case of Lieutenant William L. Calley who was tried
for the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.2" According to U.S. law, "acts of a
subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order by his superior are
excused unless the order was one which a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know to be unlawful."'2
The Yunis Court instructed the jury that Yunis could prevail on the
obedience to orders defense if it found that the Amal Militia was a "military
organization." To make that finding, however, the judge indicated that the jury
had to determine that: (1) the Amal Militia had a hierarchical command
structure; (2) it generally conducted itself in accordance with the laws of war;
and (3) its members had a distinctive symbol and carried their arms openly.'
Although the jury did not find that the Amal Militia met this test, at least some
terrorist organizations would qualify as a "military organization" under it, and
thus have the right to rely on the obedience to orders defense.
C. The Ahmed Extradition Case
In the Mahmoud EI-Abed Ahmed Extradition case, a United States district
court used the rules of armed conflict by analogy to determine whether a
peacetime terrorist act could qualify for the political offense exception to
extradition.' In 1986, Ahmed attacked an Israeli passenger bus near Tel Aviv,
and then fled to the United States. At his extradition hearing, his lawyer, former
United States Attorney-General Ramsey Clark, argued that this was a non-
extraditable political offense.
The Court held that a person relying on the political offense exception must
prove the acceptability of his offense under the laws of war, even when there did
not exist an armed conflict as such at the time of the offense.' The Court found
that Ahmed's acts did not qualify for the political offense exception because
they violated Additional Protocol H's prohibition on targeting civilians.26 While
this result ensured that Ahmed would be prosecuted in Israel, the implication of
the holding is that if a terrorist targets military personnel or a government
installation, the terrorist would be protected by the political offense exception.
21. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22 C.M.A. 534 (1973).
22. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1097.
23. Id.
24. Ahmed v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. N.Y. 1989), afftd. 910 F. 2d 1063 (2nd Cir.
1990).
25. Id. at 404.
26. Id. at 406.
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H. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR TO
PEACETIME ACTS OF TERRORISM
The Abella, Yunis, and Ahmed cases show that domestic and inteffnational
judicial bodies are beginning to apply the laws of war to terrorist acts outside
the traditional concept of armed conflict. These cases thus provide a precedent
for treating terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes. But these cases
also indicate some of the problems inherent to this approach, which stem from
the fact that the laws of war establish rights as well as obligations for those over
whom they apply.
The first problem is that, under this approach, terrorists can rely on the
"combatant's privilege," under which combatants are immune from prosecution
for common crimes.27 For example, killing a combatant is justified homicide,
not murder. This means that terrorist attacks on military, police, or other
government personnel would not be prosecutable or extraditable offenses.
Similarly, kidnapping a combatant constitutes a lawful taking of prisoners.
Consequently, taking military or government personnel hostage would generally
not constitute a crime. Finally, government installations are a lawful target of
war. Thus, terrorist attacks on military, police, or government buildings would
not be regarded as criminal. And the collateral damage doctrine would apply,
such that injury or deaths to civilians would not be regarded as criminal so long
as the target was a government installation, and reasonable steps were taken to
minimize the risk to innocent civilians.
The second problem is that the approach would permit assassination of
political leaders while they are within their own borders. The Internationally
Protected Person Convention only protects heads of state, high level officials,
and diplomats when they are on a mission outside of their home state.28 The
laws of war, which would apply to such persons while within their country,
make it a war crime to kill "treacherously," 29-understood as prohibiting
assassination.' But this prohibition has been narrowly interpreted to, for
example, permit targeting military or civilian commanders during a conflict. 31
27. See Netherlands Law Concerning Trials of War Criminals, in 11 UNITEDNATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 86 (1949); Baxter, The Municipal and
International Law Basis of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 382, 384-85 (1951);
Waldemar Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under Domestic Law and
Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U.L REv. 53 (1983).
28. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1037 U.N.T.S. 167.
29. Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of
Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23 (b), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
30. Department of the Army, the Law of Land Warfare art. 31 (1956) (Army Field Manual No. 27-
10, Washington, D.C.).
31. W. HAYS PARKS, Menwrandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW
Executive Order 12,333, which prohibits United States government personnel
from engaging in assassination,32 has been subject to a similarly narrow
interpretation. Shortly after the 1986 bombing of Libyan leader Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi's personal quarters in Tripoli, Senior Army lawyers made
public a memorandum that concluded that Executive Order 12,333 was not
intended to prevent the United States from acting in self-defense against
"legitimate threats to national security" even during peacetime.3 3 If the laws of
war apply to terrorists it would logically follow that they have the same right as
governments to target military or civilian commanders and others who pose a
threat to the security of their self-determination movement.
The third problem is that the approach would entitle terrorists to prisoner
of war (hereinafter POW) status, which requires that they be given special rights
beyond those afforded to common prisoners. In United States v. Noriega,34
General Noriega argued that Article 22 of the Third Geneva Convention
required that he not be interned in a penitentiary. 35 Although the District Court
held that Article 22 did not apply to POWs convicted of common crimes, it
agreed that General Noriega was entitled to POW status and therefore entitled
to the protections of Article 13 ("humane treatment"); Article 14 ("respect for
their persons and their honour"); and Article 16 ("equal treatment"). General
Noriega's jail cell has been described as having all the amenities of a hotel suite,
including a television, phone and fax machine, and a private bathroom.
Finally, as the Fawas Yunis Case demonstrated, the approach would enable
terrorists to rely on the obedience to orders defense. This may be a fair tradeoff
for providing the prosecution with the use of the doctrine of command
responsibility, but at least in some cases it will render it more difficult to obtain
a conviction of accused terrorists.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposal to define terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes
necessitates application of the laws of war to terrorists. The approach would fill
some of the gaps of the current anti-terrorism treaty regime. It would give the
prosecution the ability to argue the doctrine of command responsibility, which
was not previously applicable to peacetime acts. And it will encourage terrorist
5 (Dec. 1989) (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-204).
32. Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 59, 941 (Dec. 8, 1981).
33. PARKS, supra note 31, at 8.
34. United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
35. Article 22 provides: "Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and
affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the
interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries." Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of war, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135, Art.
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groups to play by the rules of international humanitarian law. On the other
hand, the approach virtually declares open season on attacks on government
personnel and facilities. It would encourage insurrection by reducing the
personal risks of rebels. And it would enhance the perceived standing of
insurgents by treating them as combatants rather than common criminals.
It is important that those advocating this new approach to the definition of
terrorism be fully aware of all the legal consequences that stem from the
approach. It is no panacea, and in the final analysis the negative consequences
may render it another dead end in the age-old struggle to define terrorism.
Thus, this may be a case of too much convergence.
